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Despite its title, this book is not merely about 'feminist'
approaches to bioethics. It is not merely about bioethics. It discusses
non-feminist approaches to ethics as such and then compares them with feminist
approaches to ethics. It considers nonfeminist approaches to bioethics
and compares them with feminist approaches to bioethics. It looks at the
particular issues of contraception and sterilization; abortion; artificial
insemination and in-vitro fertilization; surrogate motherhood (including
commercial surrogate motherhood); genetic screening, diagnosis, counselling
and therapy and, following the same pattern, considers nonfeminist and
then feminist perspectives on them.
Whether there is, or should be, or could be, a feminist
ethics or bioethics is an intriguing question. It is not at all clear that
Tong has settled the matter in the way that she intended to.
For instance, it is not clear that arguments in this area
can readily be classified as 'feminist' or 'nonfeminist'. Furthermore,
given that some so-called 'feminist' arguments are good ones and some are
bad ones and that some so called 'non-feminist' arguments are good ones
and some are bad ones, it is very difficult, when reading this book, to
be confident that it is a worthwhile exercise to take the distinction between
feminist and non-feminist approaches very seriously. Why does Tong not
simply defend good arguments - whether they are feminist, non-feminist,
anti-feminist or whatever - and attack bad ones?
According to Tong, "...to date, the only factor that has
united all feminist approaches to bioethics is not a common politics, ontology,
epistemology, or ethics but instead a shared methodology ... Diversity
rather than unity is the order of the day. Yet all feminist approaches
to bioethics seem interested in asking the so-called woman or gender question,
raising women's (and men's) consciousness about the subordinate status
of women and eliminating gaps between feminist theory and feminist practice.
For feminist bioethicists a question-posing, consciousness-raising session
that does not conclude with a program of action aimed at overcoming gender
inequalities in the realms of medicine and science is morally incomplete."
I am not sure that this gets us very far. When talking
about the variety of so-called feminist perspectives in relation to contraception
and sterilization, Tong writes: "Diversity is a sign of the richness and
vitality of feminist thought." It might be. It might be a sign that the
term 'feminist' in relation to perspectives and approaches in ethics and
bioethics is not a useful one.
Tong writes: "Feminist approaches to bioethics are not
a substitute for traditional and alternative non-feminist approaches to
bioethics ... on the contrary, they need to be recognized by non-feminist
bioethicists as partial, provisional, and suggestive perspectives on what
counts as good clinical decision-making and wise public policy-making".
Bad argument will hardly help us make wise public policies
even if the bad arguments happen to be bad feminist arguments. Good arguments
might do so even if they are good non-feminist arguments.
Tong is, I would suggest, an egalitarian and specifically
a 'gender egalitarian'. What seems to distress her is inequality, and specifically
inequality between, in general, men and women.
It is not manifest that such distress is appropriate.
Some sorts of inequalities in some contexts are indefensible, but is inequality
per se wrong? For instance, if a judge gives men and women who are equally
guilty of having committed the same crimes different sentences this would
clearly be wrong. If it turns out that, say, women live on average longer
than men in some societies, then this is not obviously wrong. It is not
obvious that it would be preferable if, say, through a reduction in the
average life span of women, gender equality of life expectancy were produced.
Again, the Mafia, so I am told, is not an 'equal opportunities' employer.
For instance, males and females do not have the same prospects of career
advancement within it. Would the world be a better place if they did? I
doubt it. Would the world be a better place if as many women as men now
do committed murder or if as many women were in prison as there are now
men in prison?
An argument like the following seems to lurk behind Tong's
views. In order to have the same opportunities, powers and status as men,
women need X. Therefore, women have a right to X. Thus stated, the argument
seems unconvincing.
In what sense could they have such a 'right'? A right
against whom or what? Can women as a collective group have rights and duties?
It is not only individual people that can have rights and duties. For instance,
states, golf clubs and legal entities such as industrial corporations can
have them as well. But can collective entities such as 'men' and 'women'
have rights and duties? Since they are neither agents nor agencies, I suggest
they cannot.
This comprehensive and very readable book is packed with
arguments. Although, as the title suggests, the book is intended to champion
'feminism', the non-feminists' arguments are presented very fairly and
with great care and clarity. Whilst it is more than a survey of the field
- it is an original contribution to a broad debate - I think this book,
which, in paperback, is reasonably priced - would function very well as
a text-book. In fact, I think that I shall recommend it as a book for possible
purchase by students on a course which I am about to run on "Issues in
Applied Philosophy".
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