tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7739403784714088758.post3752612514334801748..comments2024-03-02T05:12:07.589-08:00Comments on The Philosopher: Grist for Leibniz's Mill (2017)docmartincohenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07116346310852077070noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7739403784714088758.post-37113979728232283442017-10-09T06:55:08.057-07:002017-10-09T06:55:08.057-07:00Keith, thank you for the comment; please allow me ...Keith, thank you for the comment; please allow me to address the point(s) you raise.<br /><br />Penrose's argument really says only this: there are questions accessible to logical reasoning, to which no algorithm can give an answer, but the mind can. From there, it follows fairly inescapably that the mind cannot be reduced to an algorithm. Penrose allows for the possibility that the mind is some kind of non-algorithmic computation, based on some physical principle we do not yet understand.<br /><br />But here is the rub: every computation we know how to implement outside the mind is an algorithm, embodied in a device reducible to a Turing machine. Quantum computing is of Turing type; so are neural nets and self-modifying code; and so is everything we know about the functioning of the nervous system. At the present time at least, we simply do not know of any physics that can yield something other than a Turing machine. A device we'd know how to construct (i.e. comprehend in terms of known physics) could be very complex; in principle, it could in most of its aspects rise to 'personhood,' i.e. be a very good outward simulacrum of a person. But unless Penrose's argument is somehow flawed (which I don't see), there will always exist a body of reasoning that it can't perform (the halting problem), but the human mind can.<br /><br />The problem of self-awareness is more difficult because awareness appears as an immediate perception, rather than as a concept that could be analyzed; the above arguments certainly don't cover it. I would argue that both conceptual and (certainly) algorithmic computation can be done without self-awareness, and that it is the self-aware mind that is actually interested in the results. Even though this is not a proof, I find it difficult to explain self-awareness in terms of computation, or even in terms of conceptual reasoning.<br /><br />Danko<br />Danko Antolovichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04649530013689711643noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7739403784714088758.post-52927869303173225642017-10-06T11:10:14.274-07:002017-10-06T11:10:14.274-07:00Thank you, Danko, for your superb take on this int...Thank you, Danko, for your superb take on this intriguing topic; you’ve woven a fascinating account.<br /><br />I do wonder if, perhaps, Penrose’s hypothesis that the human brain — its conscious thoughts — has a nonalgorithmic component that today’s computers (artificial intelligence) can’t simulate is premature and unnecessarily too limiting. That is, the hypothesis may be only half right: the current state of artificial intelligence is certainly not up to the task, with that everyone probably agrees; however, the future of artificial intelligence might be able to step up. The future state of machines — quantum computing and even beyond, including other substrates, as well as greatly advanced knowledge in neuroscience — might offer all the consciousness (of self, others, and the environment), cognition, and array of other attributes one associates with the human mind. A circumstance encapsulating the range of ‘other attributes’: imagination, creativity, sentience, presence in time and space, visions of alternative futures, analysis of the past, perceptiveness, emotions, ethics, self-optimization (self-programming), opinions, empathy, ‘qualia’-like experiences, and more. Indeed, there might be a tipping point — a catalytic moment, if you will — at which such a machine, by any measure (beyond Turing-like tests, of course), rises to ‘personhood’. Perhaps we’d stop calling it a ‘machine.’ In short, I wonder if neuroscience and artificial intelligence (and correlates like cognitive science) will eventually — the timeframe unknown at this juncture — have some answers that will (disruptively!) bear on these issues regarding the fundamental nature of consciousness, cognition, and ‘personhood’.<br />Keithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05120485893579137602noreply@blogger.com